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Abstract Field trials with GM crops are not only
plant science experiments. They are also social
experiments concerning the implications of govern-
ment imposed regulatory constraints and public
opposition for scientific activity. We assess these
implications by estimating additional costs due to
government regulation and public opposition in a
recent set of field trials in Switzerland. We find that
for every Euro spent on research, an additional 78
cents were spent on security, an additional 31 cents
on biosafety, and an additional 17 cents on govern-
ment regulatory supervision. Hence the total addi-
tional spending due to government regulation and
public opposition was around 1.26 Euros for every
Euro spent on the research per se. These estimates are
conservative; they do not include additional costs that
are hard to monetize (e.g. stakeholder information
and dialogue activities, involvement of various
government agencies). We conclude that further field
experiments with GM crops in Switzerland are
unlikely unless protected sites are set up to reduce
these additional costs.
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Abbreviations
GM Genetically modified
ART Agroscope Reckenholz-Ta¨niken
ACW Agroscope Changins-Wa¨denswil
SNSF Swiss National Science Foundation
NRP National Research Program
FOEN Federal Office for the Environment
Introduction
Genetically modified (GM) crops are controversial in
Switzerland, as they are in most other European
countries. In 2005, Swiss voters decided to enact a
five-year moratorium on commercial cultivation of
GM crops. This moratorium was due to end in 2010,
but was recently extended until late 2013. Scientific
research, including field experiments with GM plants,
is exempt from the moratorium. Most proponents of the
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moratorium—and of course also the opponents of the
moratorium—in fact believe that scientific research on
GM plants should continue in the moratorium period to
clarify the benefits and risks of GM crops. They expect
that such research will help voters and policy-makers
make a well-reasoned choice on what should happen
after the moratorium ends.
As part of this process, Switzerland’s government
asked the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF)
to implement a research program on the benefits and
risks of GM plants (National Research Program, NRP
59, http://www.nfp59.ch). This research, which star-
ted in June 2007 and will end in 2012, includes field
trials with powdery mildew (fungal) resistant GM
wheat lines in two locations. Table 1 indicates the
size and location of these field trials.
The field trials at the first location started in spring
2008 and were concluded in autumn 2010. Those at
the second location started 1 year later, in spring
2009, because of an (eventually unsuccessful) appeal
by opponents to the Swiss Federal Administrative
Court1 and were concluded in autumn 2010 as well.
The purpose of these field trials is to examine whether
GM wheat lines that are resistant against powdery
mildew infections in the lab have this capacity also
under natural conditions; and whether negative effects
in terms of reduced crop performance or biosafety risks
occur. The biosafety part of the field trials focuses on
interactions of GM wheat lines with the environment,
other plants, and non-target organisms. (http://www.
konsortium-weizen.ch/).
Compared to the very few field trials with GM
plants in Switzerland prior to the NRP 59, the recent
field trials are larger in scale; and they involve several
research projects carried out by different teams but
managed by a coordinating committee of scientists.
Moreover, in contrast to previous field trials, they are
carried out as part of a larger research activity under a
formal mandate by the Swiss government and in the
context of the new Swiss Gene Technology Law and
the revised Release Ordinance.
How easy (or difficult) is it for scientists to carry
out field trials with GM plants under specific social
and political or regulatory conditions? We argue that
an estimate of costs can provide a reasonably good
answer. Hence we have examined the costs of the
Swiss GM plant field trials.
Additional costs due to government regulation
and public opposition
We are interested primarily in those costs that have
materialized above and beyond the standard costs of
conducting field trials with GM plants. The bench-
mark for those additional costs is the basic research
costs that would arise in the absence of any legal and
regulatory constraints and public opposition. Most
countries worldwide have established some regula-
tion for GM plants, and some opposition to GM
plants exists in most countries that allow commercial
cultivation of and/or scientific field experiments with
GM crops. Hence the benchmark of no regulation
and no public opposition is somewhat artificial. Nor
may such a situation be desirable. However, we use
this benchmark because it avoids any normative
judgements about how much regulation is appropri-
ate or necessary, and in what form, and how much
public opposition is useful or legitimate. We return
to this issue in the discussion section at the end of
the paper.
Table 1 Size (in m2) and location of GM field trials
2008 2009 2010
GM wheat, ART 400 555 805
Total area, ART 5,000 8,700 7,200
Ratio of GM/non-GM 0.08 0.06 0.11
GM wheat, ACW – 271 271
Total area, ACW – 947 947
Ratio of GM/non-GM – 0.29 0.29
Agroscope Reckenholz-Ta¨nikon (ART) is located near Zurich
(4725044.2000N/830058.8700E). The GM field trial of
Agroscope Changins-Wa¨denswil (ACW) is located in Pully
near Lausanne (4630035.2100N/639042.2800E). For scientific
reasons (e.g. comparison with conventional varieties,
surrounding experiments with a border crop) each field trial
includes a large proportion of non-GM plots
The values are given in bold for better distinction of the two
locations and for highlighting the ratios compared to the areas
1 The plaintiffs challenged the field trial permit by the FOEN
(Swiss Federal Office for the Environment) on procedural
grounds, claiming that the step-by-step approval process
required by law was not properly implemented. The court
approved the plaintiffs’ request to delay the beginning of the
field trial until the court had decided. However, the court
eventually decided against the plaintiffs, judging that the
approval procedure had been correctly implemented. But the
court decision came too late for the field trial to start as
planned.
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In brief, we are primarily interested in estimating
the additional costs that arise from government
regulation and public opposition to field trials with
GM plants. Whether these additional costs are too
high, too low, or appropriate is a normative question
that must be answered by policy-makers, scientists
interested in such field trials, research funding
agencies, and society as a whole.
A rigorous estimate of additional costs would
require an experiment in which otherwise identical
field trials are carried out in two different settings, one
with current Swiss levels of regulation and public
opposition, the other in the absence of any government
regulation and public opposition (holding all other
determinants of costs constant). This is obviously not
possible. However, the second best approach is to
isolate those costs that, with high probability, would
not have materialized in the absence of government
regulation and public opposition.
To identify those additional costs we have exam-
ined the expenditures for the two field trials, from the
preparation to the decommissioning stage. Figure 1
summarizes the results.
Expressed as ratios, which allow for comparison in
any currency: for every Euro or US Dollar spent on
the research per se, an additional 78 cents were spent
on security, an additional 31 cents on biosafety, and
an additional 17 cents on government regulatory
supervision. Thus, total additional spending due to
government regulation and public opposition was in
the order of 1.26 Euros for every Euro spent for the
research per se. In other words, these field trials with
GM plants in Switzerland have cost more than twice
of what they would have cost in the absence of
government regulation and public opposition.
Table 2 reports more detailed figures. The lion’s
share of additional costs incurred during the prepara-
tion phase concerns the approval process. Those costs
were borne mainly by the applicants’ (ETH Zurich
(http://www.pb.ethz.ch/) and University of Zurich
(http://botserv1.uzh.ch/home/bkeller/), ART (http://www.
agroscope.admin.ch/org/00275/), ACW (http://www.
agroscope.admin.ch/org/00273/)) institutions and the
FOEN.
Following a recommendation by the FOEN, the
applicants submitted three separate requests for field
trials to the FOEN. Two of these dealt with different
wheat lines, the third concerned an experiment with a
hybrid of wheat and goat grass (Aegilops cylindrica).
The applications were, in principle, for 3 years, but
each field trial still needed specific authorization for
each season. In other words, the approval procedure
for the field trials of the so called wheat consortium
(http://www.konsortium-weizen.ch/) involved three
separate approval processes, with two additional
authorizations required for the second and third of the
Fig. 1 Total spending for research, security, biosafety, and
regulatory supervision. Notes Spending on security has served
to protect the field trials from acts of vandalism, the key threat
emanating from public opposition. Biosafety expenses are
largely due to government regulation. Costs for regulatory
supervision are estimates of what the Swiss Federal Office for
the Environment (FOEN) spent for dealing with the field trial
applications and supervising the implementation of the trials
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three growing seasons at Reckenholz and one addi-
tional authorization for Pully. Two additional ele-
ments of complexity were that two universities (ETH
Zurich, University of Zurich) were involved, and the
experiments took place in two different regions of the
country. The latter implicated distinct stakeholder
information/consultation processes (these are required
by law) and submission of the applications in German
and French.
The FOEN, according to its own estimates, has
incurred costs in the order of 329,000 EUR, primarily
in the form of personnel expenses, for handling the
entire research program.2 It was not possible to
separate the expenses between the preparation and
implementation phase. However, the bulk of the
expenses materialized during the preparation phase.
Besides staff work time for evaluating the applica-
tions, considerable work time went into handling of
petitions against the field trials and a legal case that
was launched by opponents against the FOEN’s
decision to permit the experiments in Pully. Some
other parts of the federal administration were
involved in the process as well,3 though the FOEN
was the lead agency for these field trials. However, it
was not possible to obtain any reliable information on
the financial implications for government bodies
other than the FOEN. Rough estimates by the FOEN
are in the order of 7,300–73,000 EUR, but we do not
include such costs in our estimate.
The wheat consortium, in particular the groups
from the University of Zurich, ETH Zurich, ACW,
and ART, who carried out the field experiments,
spent around 254,000 EUR to prepare the applica-
tions. This amount includes staff salaries for prepar-
ing the applications (documents of several hundred
pages) and revising them according to follow-up
requests by the FOEN. It also includes biosafety
expenses associated with preparing the seeds, testing
of the plant material, elaborating a biosafety emer-
gency plan for the field trial, and an application fee of
13,000 EUR charged by the FOEN.4
The most important additional cost items were
security and biosafety expenses. Initial security
measures included a single fence and, during the
growing season, a security guard at night and on
weekends. They also included permanent video
surveillance. After an attack by radical GMO oppo-
nents in June 2008, in which a major part of the field
trial in Reckenholz was damaged, a new security
concept was developed. A three-meter-spaced double
fence with barbwire on top and a motion sensor at the
outer fence were installed. Moreover, the security
guard presence was extended to 24 h (one security
guard with a specially trained dog at any point in time
during the growing season). Figure 2 shows the
entrance to the field at the ART site with the double
fence in place.
These additional measures were put in place at both
sites (ART and ACW). Two minor attacks on the site in
Pully (ACW) took place in 2009 and 2010, when
offenders tried to spray herbicides over the fences.
Table 2 Estimates of additional costs
Type of cost Cost in
Euros
Application for and preparation of field trials 254,000
Legal expenses related to obtaining approval for
the trials
88,000
Security costs (for both sites, Reckenholz and
Pully)
1,384,000
Biosafety (for both sites, Reckenholz and Pully) 584,000
Decommissioning stage 57,000
Total 2,367,000
2 This part of the data collection and cost estimation was
carried out by Dr. Hans Hosbach from FOEN.
3 E.g. the Federal Office for Agriculture (FOAG), the Federal
Office of Public Health (FOPH), the Office for Waste, Water,
Energy and Air (AWEL) of the Canton of Zurich, the Office for
the Environment and Energy of the Canton of Vaud (SEVEN),
the Federal Committee for Biosafety, and the Federal Ethics
Committee on Non-Human Biotechnology.
4 The application fees charged by the FOEN were funded by
the SNSF, the remaining expenses by the applicants’ institu-
tions. The production of the GM seeds took around 15 months
and cost around 100,000 EUR (including the gardener, energy
in the greenhouse, soil, fertilizer, and plant protection products,
and infrastructure). We include these costs in our estimate
because the seed production in the greenhouse as required by
the FOEN is much more expensive than the usual seed
production in the field (without any regulatory restrictions it
would have cost no more than around 3,700 EUR to produce
the seeds). Salaries of scientists are not included in the
mentioned amounts. The translation of the applications into
German and French is not included in our cost estimates
because we could not reliably estimate the total work time and
costs of this activity.
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However, the field trials were left undamaged. A
specialist of the Swiss Federal Police provided advice
throughout the field trial period, but this work is
difficult to monetize and is not included in our estimate.
The SNSF initially granted 730,000 EUR for
security measures and the organization of the overall
project (the latter consists of 8 individual research
projects). After the attack in June 2008, the State
Secretariat for Education and Research (SER), which
funds the NRP 59 via the SNSF, added another 1.46
million EUR to the budget to fund additional security
measures. By January 2010, the SNSF had transferred
1.552 Mio EUR for security measures at the two sites,
of which the ART site received 910,000 EUR and the
ACW site 642,000 EUR. Legal proceedings concern-
ing the approval process generated costs in the order
of 88,000 EUR. These are included in the above
mentioned amount.5
Biosafety, in this context, aims primarily at pro-
tecting the surrounding environment from the unin-
tended diversion and outcrossing of GM plants. The
FOEN’s approval of the field trials requested specific
distances between the trial plots and adjacent fields
with conventional crops. Other measures included bird
protection nets, mini plots in the surrounding envi-
ronment for measuring outcrossing, very strict har-
vesting rules, and a GIS specialist who had to map the
locations of the GM crops in detail. Outcrossing tests
had to be conducted during each trial season to
establish the distance in which outcrossing of GM
wheat within the border crop, a physical pollen barrier
around the field trials, occurs. Another large share of
biosafety measures concerns communication with
neighboring farmers for coordinating the crop rota-
tion. This was necessary to ascertain the required
safety distances between GM and conventional wheat.
Biosafety-related costs at Reckenholz have been
around 99,000 EUR per year, of which approximately
85% was paid for by the SNSF. The personnel costs for
organizing and conducting the outcrossing tests
account for the largest share (around 58,000 EUR).
Bird nets, the surrounding planting, GIS work, the
communication work, and harvesting costs amount to
the remaining 41,000 EUR. Figure 3 shows part of the
harvesting process. Biosafety expenditures at Pully
have been in the order of 2,300 EUR per year for
monitoring the neighborhood and between 7,300 and
11,000 EUR per year for outcrossing tests. Because the
site in Pully is surrounded by residential areas rather
than agriculture it was not necessary to set up and
monitor mini plots. However, birds appear to be more
active in Pully, so it was necessary to install bird nets
for around 3,300 EUR.6
During the decommissioning phase, the security
installations of both sites need to be removed after the
field trial—though there currently is some discussion on
whether to leave them in place for potential future GM
Fig. 2 Gate to the field
5 The initial security installation costs at the ART field were
around 275,000 EUR, of which 248,000 EUR were paid by the
SNSF and 27,000 EUR were paid by ART. In 2008 and 2009,
the operational expenses for security were 335,000 and
307,000 EUR respectively, paid by the SNSF. The cost for
the security guard (168’000 EUR) took up the largest part of
the security costs, followed by the enhancement of the
infrastructure for surveillance of the field (146,000 EUR in
2009). Accordingly, the security costs in 2010 were around
186,000 EUR. The damage inflicted by the attack in 2008 at the
ART field was in the order of 183,000 EUR, measured by what
it would have cost to set up the field experiment again.
However, some of the scientists involved decided not to repeat
the first trial year at Reckenholz. Hence we do not include
these costs. The site in Pully spent 193,000 EUR for the
security guard and around 80,000 EUR for the initial instal-
lation of the security infrastructure and its maintenance.
Footnote 5 continued
Personnel costs for technical coordination of biosafety and
security amounted to 69,000 EUR in Reckenholz and 70,000
EUR in Pully.
6 If infrastructure costs are added, a 6 months field trial with
GM wheat costs around 365,000 EUR in the cases examined,
including all security and biosafety measures. Because
expenses for the security guard make up the largest share of
the security costs, the total amount would increase if other GM
crops with a longer growth period were tested in the field.
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crop field trials. Moreover, the FOEN approval of the
field trials includes the obligation to make sure that no
volunteer GM wheat can grow on the respective fields
after the trials are completed. Hence, the FOEN requires
monitoring of the site for 2 years after completion of the
field trial. In each of those 2 years, the site has to be
checked for the presence of wheat or goat grass plants;
all seedlings emerged must be collected, analysed for
the presence of the bar gene and burned. If a transgenic
plant is found it has to be reported to the FOEN. There is
no budget for the monitoring phase. Consequently, this
work will have to be done by employees from
Agroscope, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich using
the regular budget of these institutions. The costs during
the monitoring phase are impossible to estimate at the
moment because they depend very much on the amount
of GM seedlings. With a small number or no seedlings
these costs will be minor. The budget for the decom-
missioning of the technical installations, on the other
hand, is around 47,000 EUR in Reckenholz and around
10,000 EUR in Pully.
Figure 4 shows the development of additional
costs over time, from the preparation to the decom-
missioning phase, itemized by research, security,
biosafety, and regulatory supervision. Figure 5 shows
shares in total costs by source of funding.
Discussion
Our estimates are conservative; that is, they are likely
to underestimate total additional costs. The main
reason is that some types of costs that are difficult to
quantify reliably are not included, even though they
appear to be caused to a large degree by government
regulation and public opposition. Examples include
stakeholder information and dialogue activities (e.g.
information events and open days for farmers and the
general public), which at least to some extent are also
required by the Swiss Gene Technology law. Other
costs not considered include the SNSF staff time for
dealing with public relations issues, stakeholders, and
policy-makers—such expenses have been consider-
ably higher for the NRP 59 than for other National
Research Programs. Yet other costs we did not
include concern the involvement of government
bodies other than the FOEN, translation of applica-
tions into French and German, and damage caused by
vandalism (see above).
Whether one regards the additional costs of field
trials with GM plants, as estimated above, as
acceptable, excessive, or appropriate depends, of
course, on one’s views on the benefits and risks of
Fig. 3 Removal of spare plant material after harvesting. Note
Due to government regulation, all spare plant material had to
be separated and collected for incineration
Fig. 4 Additional costs over time
Fig. 5 Spending by institution
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GM plants.7 GMO skeptics are likely to view these
costs as necessary and acceptable, GMO enthusiasts
as excessive. Radical opponents of GM plants will
probably consider any public spending on such
research a waste of money.
Our aim is not to take sides in this controversy, but
to offer a quantative assessment of the implications of
existing regulation and public opposition for field
trials with GM plants. However, one of the key issues
in this context is whether Swiss funding agencies will
in future be willing to pay additional costs in the
same order of magnitude as in the NRP 59 program,
and whether Swiss scientists will be willing to engage
in field trials under such conditions or will carry out
such work in other countries.
The latter point raises the question of how the
estimated additional costs in Switzerland compare to
those in other countries. Unfortunately, there is no
comparable data, though the ratio of additional costs
to basic research costs in the Swiss field trials is
almost certainly much higher than in the case of field
trials in countries such as China or the United States,
where public opposition against GM-crops is less
pronounced and government regulation of field trials
is less onerous.8 Our approach could in fact be used
to estimate the additional costs of field trials with GM
crops in a wide range of countries to provide a
systematic comparison of the conditions under which
such scientific research takes place.
Which of the two types of constraints on field trials
with GM plants, government or society, is more
important quantitatively cannot be established reli-
ably with our data. The reason is that clear-cut
separation of costs due to government regulation
from those due to public opposition is virtually
impossible in at least two respects. Government rules
in Switzerland (and also in many other countries)
require public information on the exact location of a
field trial. This, in turn, makes field trials an easier
target for attacks by radical GM plant opponents,
which in turn leads to more spending on security
measures. Moreover, government regulation requir-
ing certain biosafety measures is at least in part a
consequence of public concerns about the environ-
mental and health implications of GM plants. This
difficulty of separating regulatory from social impli-
cations does, however, not affect the overall estimate
of additional costs.
Finally, our analysis points to measures that could
reduce the additional costs of field trials quite
dramatically. Arguably the most important such
measure is the establishment of protected sites that
are open to all research groups conducting publicly
funded field trials. Setting up one or more such sites
in Switzerland would require up front investments in
the order of € 730,000–1,460,000 for fences and
electronic surveillance.9 In contrast to the current
arrangement, however, this investment would not be
lost after a few field trials. Such an arrangement could
also reduce operational expenses, notably 24 h secu-
rity guards, which accounted for a large share of the
security expenses. To the extent a field trial site could
be used over many years, larger up front investments
in infrastructure-based security measures would be
cheaper in the long run than security guards.
Besides this potential for major, direct reduction of
additional costs, compliance related administration
and security costs may have scale effects and may be
reduced as a result of learning processes. This means
that with expanding numbers and sizes of field
experiments, scientists are likely to become more
efficient in handling biosafety and security chal-
lenges; and government authorities are likely to
become more efficient in handling applications for
field trials and supervising their implementation.
Without major cost reductions it appears unlikely
that further field trials with GM plants will take place
in Switzerland. GM plants with a wide range of
potential attributes as well as plants produced by
other novel genetic and other technologies are
currently developed by scientists. The implications
of not being able to independently field test these new
plants in Switzerland need to be carefully considered
by policy makers.
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